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A SYMPOSIUM:
Ethical Issues in Settlement
Negotiations

Session Two: Conditional
Settlement Agreements
A Transcript Featuring The Honorable Marvin Aspen,
Evett Simmons, Esq., Professor Ronald Ellington, and
Professor Bruce Green, Moderator
PROFESSORLONGAN: Our second panel today deals with questions
of conditions in settlement agreements, such as what kinds of conditions
are permissible and which ones are not. To moderate this panel, we
have Professor Bruce Green from Fordham University Law School.
Bruce is a member of the ABA Litigation Section Task Force that is
working on these guidelines, and thus is very familiar with them, as was
Professor Mashburn. Professor Mashburn is the reporter for the task
force.
Our panel includes Judge Marvin Aspen, the Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Chicago. We have Ron Ellington, who is the A. Gus Cleveland Professor
of Ethics and Professionalism at the University of Georgia. We also
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have with us Evett Simmons, who practices law in Florida. Today at
Law Day, for those of you who were not there, Ms. Simmons received the
Distinguished Alumnae Award. Ms. Simmons is joining us as our
practitioner for this panel.
PROFESSOR GREEN: This panel focuses on ethics issues raised by
settlement agreements that are different from those raised by the
previous panel. The last discussion, of course, was largely about the
relationship between lawyers and each other and their clients and the
courts. It examined procedural issues. This panel will be focusing on
the terms of the settlement agreement itself. We'll explore ethical
limitations on what the parties can agree to or, at least, what the
attorneys may assist the parties in agreeing to. Are there some things
that a lawyer just can't put in a settlement agreement?
This may seem like a strange subject for ethical guidelines. After all,
don't settling parties have freedom of contract? How do ethics rules
come in to the question of what a plaintiff and defendant can agree on?
To be sure, one could imagine some obvious limitations on what the
parties can agree on. Suppose the agreement would be illegal-for
example, a settlement agreement providing that the parties will engage
in illegal price-fixing. Certainly a lawyer can't assist in that agreement.
This is true not so much because of ethics rules independently, but
because of criminal law. A lawyer can't aid and abet a crime.
Beyond the question of what kinds of legal restrictions there might be
on the terms of a settlement agreement, we're going to look at the
question of independent ethical or professional limitations. Are there
just some things that a lawyer can't do as a matter of ethics? To help
us, we have three hypotheticals that Professor Longan drafted.
The first one deals with two types of settlement provisions. One type
of provision limits what the lawyer may do after the case is over. For
example, may the lawyer use information learned in the representation,
or is there a restriction on who the lawyer may later represent? The
second type involves the lawyer's fee.
Right away, you can imagine issues of lawyer ethics kicking in.
What's unique about these settlement provisions is that they govern the
lawyer and not just the parties. This settlement agreement in the
hypothetical has three provisions that we'll deal with.
The first provision in this settlement of an antitrust case says that the
negotiations and the amount of the settlement will remain confidential
and neither the lawyer nor the client may use this information in any
way in the future. So the first part is an agreement that the lawyer will
keep certain information confidential.
The second part is that the
plaintiff's firm waives any claim for attorney's fees under the antitrust
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statute. And the last provision, which I dare say is not a terribly
common one, says that 30 days after the settlement the plaintiff's firm
will receive a general retainer of $1,000,000 from the defendant and
thereafter act as the defendant's litigation prevention counsel.
Let's take them one at a time starting with the confidentiality
provision. And let me begin by directing your attention to the two draft
guidelines that bear on this. First, 4.2.6. It's called "agreement to keep
settlement terms and other information confidential." It says, "in
general"-and the "in general" is the interesting phrase-"a lawyer may
ethically negotiate and agree to be bound by an agreement that the
lawyer and the client will keep settlement terms and other information
relating to the litigation confidential." In other words, the general
principle is you can have a confidentiality provision in the settlement
agreement.
The other guideline to which I direct your attention is 4.2.1, called
"conditioning settlement on restricting opposing lawyer's right to practice
or consult." It says, "a lawyer may not offer or accept a settlement
conditioned on an agreement that directly or indirectly,"-and that's the
interesting phrase here-"directly or indirectly".-"precludes the lawyer
for one party from representing clients in future litigation against the
opposing party."
Let's start with the first provision in the hypothetical. Why would the
parties want to have a provision that says that the negotiations and the
amount of the settlement will be kept confidential?
What's the
motivation here, Ms. Simmons?
MS. SIMMONS: The motivation is to keep future plaintiffs from going
after the same client. Often, the defendant is a corporation. When the
issue involves product liability, such as in the case of Firestone,there are
multiple potential plaintiffs. If the amount that one plaintiff receives is
publicized and substantial, other potential plaintiffs may want the same
or more.
PROFESSOR GREEN: So, if future plaintiffs know what the
defendant is willing to settle for, they're going to all line up to begin
suing the defendant?
MS. SIMMONS: I think so because potential plaintiffs are going to
also think that perhaps the defendant is admitting that liability is a
concern so I do have a case. I mean defendants are settling these
actions, and they're not settling them in a manner that would suggest
that they are frivolous. This could encourage additional litigation.
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PROFESSOR GREEN: Is that a legitimate consideration? Once
parties file a lawsuit, they begin taxing the resources of the courts, for
which we as taxpayers pay. At that point, should they be able to keep
settlement terms confidential or is there some public interest in knowing
how these publicly filed lawsuits are settled?
JUDGE ASPEN: Well, it depends upon what terms you are talking
about. I do not think there is any public interest in knowing the amount
of the settlement. The defendant takes a perfectly legitimate and ethical
position in saying, "I do not want to publish the amount of the settlement because that means that other people are going to think there is
a big fat cat here and we are going to get a whole lot of lawsuits."
However, it is different if you are talking about keeping confidential
information that was part of the negotiations that really relates to the
public interest, as when a tire is horribly defective and we are going to
keep that quiet as part of the settlement agreement, but the tire is going
to continue to be manufactured and will still be on the market. Or even
if it goes off the market, other people who have been damaged by this
tire are not going to have information that is available as to some of the
defects. So you really have to talk about what terms you are keeping
confidential.
PROFESSOR GREEN: You've invited me to change the facts a bit.
Let's suppose it's a products-liability, personal-injury case, and all kinds
of material is exchanged during the case. The plaintiff learns information that suggests that there really is a defect, which of course was the
subject of the lawsuit in the first place. Precisely for that reason, the
defendant is willing to make a favorable settlement on the condition that
all that discovery material be returned and all the information learned
in the course of the settlement negotiations, and learned in the course
of discovery and learned in the course of the lawsuit will not be disclosed
or used by the plaintiff's lawyer. Do you see that as different?
JUDGEASPEN: Well, I do not see any black letter law or black letter
medical principle that covers that, but I can tell you that 20 years ago
nobody would even think that there was any problem at all with keeping
that information quiet as part of the settlement agreement. I think
there is a trend among courts in situations where the court has to
approve the settlement, to look at that type of information and see
whether it is proper for the court to agree to that type of settlement.
PROFESSOR GREEN: So you, as a Judge, might think twice about
approving the terms of the settlement. But what about from the
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lawyer's perspective? Is there any reason why the lawyers shouldn't
negotiate that term? Presumably, the settlement amount is much higher
if this plaintiff is willing to effectively gag the lawyer. Is there any
reason why the plaintiff's lawyer or the defendant's lawyer should
hesitate?
MS. SIMMONS: I was struggling with that concept because if you
look at the misconduct it's not really the lawyer's misconduct it's the
client's misconduct, if you want to even call it misconduct. I think that
there is an attorney/client privilege because all of the information was
elicited by the lawyer in the process of representing his client. I would
have difficulty with revealing that information unless I first obtained the
consent of my client.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Professor Ellington, you've been silent.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Yes, I have. There are several things
going on here it seems to me. You asked about why parties may want
confidentiality about the terms and the amount of the settlement. And
we talked about some bad reasons: to protect the defendant from facing
liability from future suits involving the same dangerous product. And
I think we'll talk about that more with a later hypothetical.
Let me suggest perhaps a very salutary and good reason, that is that
the settlement may come off if the parties are able to publicly present it
as a win-win situation for both sides. It reminds me of a case where the
patient sued the hospital after an infant was stolen from the hospital,
and it resulted both in the payment of money to the plaintiff, but also
the announcement that the hospital was putting into place new protocols
and guidelines to protect against that in the future. The hospital, I
think, very much wanted to have the public response be that we're being
proactive and we're doing these things to prevent this in the future
rather than, and by the way, we also have paid the plaintiff a great deal
of money on the side. Sometimes settlements can have a very salutary
role in trying to achieve a win-win situation for both of the parties.
There's nothing wrong with that if it helps in the process of resolving
the dispute.
One of the other things it seems to me that this hypothetical raises for
us is the constraint from the confidentiality agreement that goes so far
that it runs afoul of Model Rule 5.6 and the provisions of the draft
guidelines that say that lawyers cannot directly or indirectly restrict
their practice, their ability to take future cases. And, in fact, the
commentary to the guidelines specifically recognizes that a settlement
agreement that so restricts the ability of the lawyer to take future cases,
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that even though they don't directly agree not to bring future cases they
indirectly achieve the same result through the settlement agreement's
terms on confidentiality. So that would be a concern.
PROFESSOR GREEN: All of you seem to think the confidentiality
term in this hypothetical is mother, country, apple pie. But, let's
suppose that the next antitrust plaintiff comes in the door and says, "I
don't know what the result was but I know you represented plaintiff
number one. I know you're a great antitrust lawyer. I want you to
represent me against that same defendant." Suppose, you're a party to
the confidentiality provision that says you may not use-it doesn't say
you may not disclose-it says you may not use this information in the
future. Can you take on that next client against the same defendant in
a similar antitrust case? Or is there such a risk that you would use that
settlement information, which Ms. Simmons says you'd want to use if
you knew it?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: I think that is a risk, and that's why
agreeing to this in the settlement poses that risk.
JUDGEASPEN: Yes, I think that is exactly the problem when the
confidentiality part of the settlement agreement includes the substance
of what was going on rather than the amount of the settlement. The
win-win situation really only comes about when you are talking about
the amount. If I sue a tabloid publication for slander because they said
something about my sex life, there would be a lot of publicity. Assume
we get a settlement and it is announced, but the amount is not
announced. I am portrayed as a winner; I "won" the lawsuit, the
magazine will pay me $100, and it is terrific because they got all that
free publicity and they could care less whether they win or lose. All they
care about is the bottom line. You see those kinds of settlements with
confidentiality agreements often. I do not know whether it is the winwin or the lose-lose, but that is not the troublesome type of agreement.
The troublesome type of agreement is the one where the subject
matter is not disclosed and it will cause one of two problems, which we
have discussed: (1) the problem of creating a danger that affects the
public interest, or (2) the one that you suggest, the problem that affects
the practice of law. The second problem arises when I, in effect, by
agreeing to the settlement agreement, have taken myself out of all these
cases in the future and I have taken myself out as a resource person for
other people that might be filing these lawsuits.
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PROFESSOR GREEN: This seemingly innocuous provision would
seem to come within the language of one of the guidelines, which says
that generally you can have a settlement provision requiring that you
keep confidential the settlement terms. But the ABA would say this is
an unethical provision, wouldn't it? There's an ABA opinion on point,
Opinion 00-417 from April of 2000. It says that under the ABA Model
Rules, a lawyer may not disclose a former client's information, but
there's no bar on using the information as long as you're not using it
against the former client. If you purport to have a settlement provision
that forbids any use of information concerning the settled lawsuit, as
opposed to the disclosure of information, that goes too far because it
indirectly forecloses that lawyer from taking on future cases. There's a
clash, I think, between the intuition of these two approaches. Where
would you come out on this, Professor Ellington?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Well, I think I tend to prefer upholding
prohibitions that restrict directly or indirectly the lawyer's ability to take
future cases.
PROFESSOR GREEN: In New York, we have an appellate court
opinion that enforced a settlement agreement that barred the plaintiff's
lawyer from taking on future clients against the defendant. It relied on
an article by Professor Stephen Gillers of NYU who said that the ethical
rule forbidding this type of settlement agreement is anachronistic and
illogical. But you seem to like the ethical rule. Why?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Well, I like the rule, but not for the
reasons that are traditionally given for it. And we can talk about that
right now I suppose. It seems to me the reasons traditionally given for
5.6, at least what the commentary to 5.6 says, is that this rule is
necessary to ensure that the public or client will have a choice of
counsel. A client will have access to a lawyer.
And as an empirical matter, one might wonder if today, given the
number of lawyers out there, it's necessary to have a rule that in sort
of a paternalistic way says that a lawyer, unlike, the other, you know,
other skilled people, be they baseball players or someone else, can't agree
to restrict the sale of their services if they choose to.
Now, I think if you take a subset of all possible cases and imagine the
sort of toxic tort case made famous by the movie A Civil Action or an
antitrust suit or a complex product liability suit or a suit involving
breast implants where there's a great deal of science and a great deal of
expense for experts that will have to be put up front in order to
successfully bring such an action, you are limiting the number of lawyers
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who can, and have the wherewithal to bring those sorts of cases. So
there may be something to that notion that by restricting the available
market for legal services in this way the public is being harmed.
My own supposition about this is that the unarticulated reason for this
rule is concern about the wedge that it drives between the client and the
lawyer, raising a conflict of interest. When the lawyer is separately
bargaining to sell or not sell in the future his legal services in turn for
payment by the opposing party it's a very risky situation created for the
lawyer's duty of loyalty and trustworthiness to his or her present client.
PROFESSOR GREEN: That raises a question. You point out rightly
that part of what the rule is about is the conflict of interest. So let's
suppose the defendant says to the plaintiff, "I'll give you $1,000,000 if
you have this confidentiality provision and $750,000 if you don't." And
let's suppose the lawyer is getting paid by the hour. Does the lawyer
have a right to say to the client, "You may not enter into this agreement
because it binds me also, and I don't want to be a party to it?"
MS. SIMMONS: I think that would depend upon what arrangement
that the lawyer and the client have in the first place. Because, as I
understand it, the right to attorney's fees belongs to the client and not
to the lawyer unless there was some written agreement at the outset
transferring that right from the lawyer to the client. But I think that
the lawyer would hopefully have a good relationship with the client.
However, ultimately it's usually the client's decision.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Well, you've now gotten us to provision
number two of the hypothetical, which is the waiver of the attorney's fee.
MS. SIMMONS: Let me finish on that one first. I had something else
about the other issue with regard to ways that, I don't know if we can
even say getting around it, my reason was not to get around the, putting
the attorney on retainer, and this is where he comes up with the
$1,000,000 retainer afterwards as a part of the settlement agreement if
the settlement agreement did not include anything about the attorney
agreeing to represent the defendant. But it just so happens after the
case is resolved then there is an agreement that the attorney enters into
that represents that the attorney is pretty good, I'm aware of that type
situation, would that then get around the rules because it was not
necessarily a part of the settlement?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Now I think that the whole thing is on the
table. So, Judge Aspen?
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JUDGE ASPEN: We are certainly into number two.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I think two and three.
JUDGEASPEN: Okay. Number two is probably the most frequent
one that any judge is aware of, and it comes up constantly-the conflict
between the attorney's fees and the settlement for the plaintiff.
Particularly where you have a statutory fee, and the defense attorney
and the defendant quite properly want to get rid of the whole case, it
does not do them any good if they just satisfy the plaintiff and then have
a big question mark as to attorney's fees because there is an insurance
company with X amount of dollars in reserve to get rid of the whole
package. That conflicts with the notion that the plaintiff's attorney has
the prime obligation to represent the plaintiff first, in my view, even at
the sacrifice of fee considerations.
Very often I will get a situation not dissimilar to this where the
parties will come to me and say, Judge, we can settle this case only if we
can resolve the attorney's fees to such-and-such amount of dollars. My
response to them always is, settle the case as far as the plaintiff is
concerned. After you have done that, and only after you have done that,
are we going to consider the attorney's fees, whether a separate
settlement negotiation or whether you bring it to me and we determine
the attorney's fees as a contested matter.
This factual situation is comparable to a common scenario in which
there are statutory attorney's fees and, because the case is being settled
(let us assume) very early on in the proceedings, the attorneys are going
to get very few dollars. The defendant has a lot of dollars and is ready
to pay the plaintiff. The attorney has an obligation at that point, in my
view, to settle the case in the best interests of the plaintiff and sacrifice
that attorney's fee. As a practical matter, you do not see that sacrifice
in many, many cases, and there is nothing a judge can do about it. The
attorneys say, "No, we are not ready to settle," so the case goes on and
litigation continues for a year or two or three years. Then the attorney's
fees have accumulated, and then the case is in a posture to settle-clearly, in my view, something that is unethical.
The other problem with Number 2 is, even if you talk to your client
and your client agrees to waive any claim for attorney's fees and you are
willing to do that and take it as a contingent fee, that, again, is a
conflict of interest. You have this lump sum, you have worked only X
amount of hours, you are going to get a fee that is worth $10,000 or
$100,000, but you say quite magnanimously, "I am going to waive my
attorney's fee. Let us enter into a contingency fee agreement." Then you
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get a fee that is three or four times the amount of the settlement that
you would have gotten under the statutory scheme at that point.
You cannot even talk to your client about it as far as I am concerned.
The conflict is so great that I am not sure that your client does not need
separate representation in order to determine whether or not that is a
bargain that the client ought to enter into at that point.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Just for my benefit and the benefit of the
first-year students here, I take it we're presupposing that the attorney
would be entitled to pocket the attorney's fee award in an anti-trust case
or a civil rights case. Is that true, or does it really depend on the terms
of the initial retainer agreement? I would have thought JUDGEASPEN: It should have been within the statute.
PROFESSOR GREEN: The statute might provide for payment of
attorney's fees, but it doesn't provide that the money goes to the
attorney. It provides that the money goes to the client, the claimant.
JUDGEASPEN: Right.
MS. SIMMONS: Right.
JUDGEASPEN: Sure.
PROFESSOR GREEN: So none of this creates a conflict unless there's
some understanding initially between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
counsel, is that right, that the counsel pockets the fee?
JUDGE ASPEN: The fact of the matter is the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's counsel would not be married together in this lawsuit if there
were no agreement up front.
PROFESSOR GREEN: If there's an agreement up front that the
attorney for the plaintiff gets to keep whatever attorney's fee is awarded,
can there also be an agreement up front that the plaintiff may not waive
the attorney's fee award? Can you deal with the issue through the
initial retainer agreement?
MS. SIMMONS: Yes. I think California is an example of a state that
suggests that as long as there is full disclosure, it's a part of the contract
and the client had an opportunity to seek other counsel, that you should
be able to. The client should be able to waive this right and permit the
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attorney to have that privilege. Because you have to remember that
attorneys take risks, too. And, so, when one is talking about contingency
fees, it may be a significant fee for Case A, but the lawyer may have
spent thousands of dollars on B, C, and D and recovered nothing. So
included in all of those risks is the possibility that at least one case,
maybe two cases, may result in a large settlement. So I don't see any
problem with these type of agreements and the recommended fee
percentages. Judge, I was listening to you talk.
JUDGEASPEN: Well your hypothetical makes it easy because the
attorney is magnanimously waiving the traditional attorney's fee
because the attorney is getting a $1,000,000 contract as prevention
counsel. So in that case, it is probably a win-win situation, both for the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney, and the losing party, of course, is
the public interest.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Ms. Simmons is right, there is a California
opinion saying that you can deal with this issue by providing a retainer
agreement that the plaintiff won't waive the fees. But there are also
opinions of the District of Columbia Bar Association, the Association Bar
of the City of New York, and others which take the opposite perspective.
They say that the decision whether to settle or not, and the decision of
what terms to settle on, is the client's decision. The client can't make an
informed decision at the beginning of the case, when entering into the
retainer agreement, about whether to waive or not to waive attorney's
fees, because the client just doesn't have enough information. And, so,
any provision in the retainer agreement that ties the client's hands with
respect to the terms of the settlement is impermissible. What do you
think, Professor Ellington? Another conflict between the Bar Associations?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: I think there is, and I think that's right,
and I was going to say that I think this is a situation that really calls
into play Model Rule 1.8 which deals with conflicts of interest and
prohibited transactions. If a lawyer has a business or financial interest
that may conflict with the client, it generally requires that the resolution
of that be fair and reasonable to the client, there be full disclosure
transmitted in writing to the client, that the client consent in writing,
that the client have a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction. The lawyer really in those
circumstances is engaged in a financial transaction with his client over
the division of that fee. And I think it ought to be approached in that
way.
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MS. SIMMONS: And that's really all you can do is disclose, because
being realistic, if I'm hearing you correctly, when the client walks in the
door and the attorney has to advance all the cost, sometimes he may not.
And then a year later the attorney has assisted the client in reaching a
resolution for $2,000,000, even if there is a waiver of fee provision, the
client can still decide whether or not to waive the fee. At that point the
client appears to be in the "win-win" position. I mean you're saying the
client does not have to honor whatever they agreed to at the outset of
the representation. The client can now say that I want it all. That
doesn't work in the real world.
PROFESSOR GREEN: A proposal of win-win. Let's turn to the third
part of this hypothetical. This looks great to me. The defendant wins
because it gets a great lawyer that's going to prevent it from committing
other anti-trust violations. The plaintiff has a good settlement,
presumably. And I guess the plaintiff's counsel wins a little bit. He gets
a reasonable fee for his services. Any problem with the last part?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: I would have thought no one would have
tried this until a couple of weeks ago when, if what I read in the local
legal newspaper is accurate, someone, indeed, in Florida did try it. The
story in the newspaper was that in an effort to bring about settlement
of a client's action, the defendant agreed to settle for more than the
highest offer that the plaintiff's class had made, and then retained the
counsel for the class as a consultant to the company going into the
future for a side payment of some several million dollars that was not
disclosed to the class. Who would have dreamt that such a thing could
be done? The rules say you can't do that, or you shouldn't do that. I
wouldn't have thought there would have been any question.
JUDGE ASPEN: I would not think so either. Number one, this is a
great asset that is part of the settlement negotiations, and that asset
belongs to the client, not to the attorney. Secondly, again going back to
the public interest component, in the ethics settlement you have taken
a very talented successful attorney out of the market to represent others
in similar situations, and to help other attorneys who would represent
those clients. But I agree PROFESSOR GREEN: I'm not sure I understand why the asset is the
client's asset. What is being sold here? What the defendant is buying
is, this lawyer won't sue this defendant again. The right of the lawyer
to take on future cases surely is the lawyer's asset. Now, you might say
that's something you're not allowed to peddle, but -

20011

SYMPOSIUM: SESSION TWO

903

JUDGEASPEN: I am not sure it is that simple. There's $1,000,000
being put on the table, and no matter how you label it, whether it is a
retainer or prevention counseling or what have you, $1,000,000 is being
put in a pot and given to the attorney, not the client.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Okay. So let's change this a little bit. Let's
suppose the defendant says I'm prepared to enter into this settlement,
and I'll throw in an additional million dollars if the plaintiff's lawyer will
come work for me at his or her hourly rate as litigation prevention
counsel after this is over. The plaintiff's lawyer says, "Hell, no. I want
to represent more plaintiffs." The plaintiff says, "Wait a second. You
know, I'd like that other million dollars." Whose decision is it?
JUDGEASPEN: I do not think that is a hard case at all. As I said,
there were two evils in this, and you have only satisfied one evil by
giving the money to the plaintiff. The other evil is taking the attorney
out of the market, and the attorney cannot agree to do that.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: And more than that, I mean you are
taking the attorney out of the market, and how much we should be
concerned about that we may debate. But I think you're going to create
a conflict and it raises a question about an attorney's loyalty and
trustworthiness with that client if separate money is being paid to the
attorney as a part of that settlement.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Let me try one more variation which was
suggested by Ms. Simmons a while back. The settlement is over.
Unfortunately for the defendant, it forgot to get a nifty confidentiality
agreement, the effect of which would be to bar the plaintiff's lawyer from
ever suing it again. So it goes to the plaintiff's lawyer and says I'd like
to retain you as litigation prevention counsel. Now there is no problem,
right?
MS. SIMMONS: I don't think so. Another way that it happens is
when there is a judgment against a defendant. And then after the
judgment the defendant retains that lawyer. And, again, I don't see a
problem. The Judge may see one.
JUDGEASPEN: No, I see no problem unless it is a sham, in which
you are going through with the settlement but everybody knows that as
soon as we get the settlement done, we have got this other deal that we
are going to cook up. If it happens just by happenstance, which is so
unlikely that it only happens when professors do hypotheticals, then I
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have no problem. But if it happens the way you said it happened, I
would suspect that it really was a sham.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Before we move to the next hypothetical, let
me pause here and see if anybody here has a question or a comment?
Okay, we've silenced the crowd.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Well, let me add a footnote before we
move on just for the law students here, and Georgia lawyers. Georgia
is one of the few states that prior to the adoption of the new rules of
professional conduct that became effective as of January 1 of this year
allowed this sort of golden handcuff to occur. The rule in Georgia,
unlike the rule in the Model Code states and unlike Model Rule 5.6, said
that in connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit a lawyer
shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law
but may enter into an agreement not to accept any other representation
arising out of the transactional event embracing the subject matter of
the controversy. So for Georgia lawyers the new rule of professional
conduct in Georgia makes a dramatic difference in the position of the
Bar and the Supreme Court on this issue.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I think that's important. Not only don't we
want any of you to be fired, we don't want any of you to be disbarred as
a result of today's program. So it's good to have a little reference to the
Georgia rules.
MS. SIMMONS: Can I just make one quick note, too?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Sure.
MS. SIMMONS: When we're talking about disclosures of settlement
agreements, to add just a human touch, because I serve as guardian ad
litem on a number of significant personal injury and medical malpractice
cases, particularly involving children, and there have been very
significant settlements with the understanding not to divulge because of
the human factor. Everybody was so upset about what happened that
they were willing to add additional monies with the understanding that
nobody would reveal any of this information.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Let's move on to the second hypothetical
which raises an issue that we touched on but backed off of at an earlier
time. You represent the plaintiff in a product liability action. In
discovery you receive a document marked "privileged and confidential,"
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detailing a study by the defendant of the product in question. The study
concludes that the product is dangerous. No privilege appears to apply
to the document. When the defendant realizes that you have the
document, the defense lawyer offers to settle the case conditioned on the
return of the study and a confidentiality clause. The lawyer claims the
study was produced inadvertently and makes it clear that the document
will not be produced in any similar litigation. The product is still on the
market.
So there's a dangerous product, a smoking gun document, and a
proposal that the defendant will up the ante if you'll give back the
document. And there's a draft guideline here, I'm not sure how well it
addresses it, 4.2.3. "Unless otherwise unlawful7-so that's a qualification-"unless otherwise unlawful, a lawyer may ethicly solicit and enter
into an agreement as part of a settlement that counsel will return or
dispose of all documents produced in discovery."
Would it be unlawful here? And, if not, is the guideline right that the
results should be that the lawyer can, and presumably would, if the
client insisted, enter into this agreement? What do you think?
MS. SIMMONS: I think that the plaintiff's attorney has to enter into
the agreement. I looked at it and I could not figure out. It didn't seem
illegal. I didn't see any significant misconduct on the part of the other
attorney. It's the other attorney's client, so it would seem to me that the
confidentiality clause would have to be in the agreement.
JUDGE ASPEN: First of all, forget about the title privileged and
confidential; that means nothing. If this material is so important in
terms of the bona fides of litigation, and if this confidentiality clause will
keep this material out of the judicial arena, it seems to me that you have
a problem. The problem is the one that we alluded to before: that this
attorney, because of the confidentiality agreement, will not be able to
represent similarly situated plaintiffs, will not be able to serve as good
counsel or as a resource to other lawyers or law firms who represent
those plaintiffs, and also will be an accessory, perhaps, to keeping a
dangerous product on the market when that product in the normal
course of the legal and judicial process would be off the market. So I
find it very problematic.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: I think if the rules of ethics allow
confidentiality about products that pose a risk to public safety, we
should expect that the legislature, which actually got there a little
faster, that the legislature is going to step in and do something about
this. It's going to no longer be -

906

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

JUDGE ASPEN: Or after this course.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: - or after this course it's no longer
going to be a matter of the rules of ethics. You see around the country
legislatures and courts saying that parties may not use confidentiality
to restrict knowledge about products that represent a public hazard and
that threaten to harm other people. And I, I mean were I the czar of
these rules, and I'm not, I don't think the position taken on this is really
strong enough. I think the ABA draft statement should take the
position that a lawyer may not agree to negotiate a confidentiality
agreement if it involves keeping secret a product that threatens public
safety or health, and that that ought to be the black letter rule, and then
you can write commentary about that. But to start from the proposition
that you could do this unless there is some legal restriction that prevents
it, I think maybe puts the cart on the wrong side of the horse.
MS. SIMMONS: So then you're bringing this, which may be how it
should be, to the same level as a client being prohibited from committing
a crime. I mean, because, an attorney can be struggling with the client
confidentiality and if what the client is telling the attorney to do cannot
be revealed and if the rules do not give it the same weight as the
commission of a crime, then there is a struggle with the lawyer as to
what to do.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Larry?
LARRYFOX: I just thought that buried in this hypo was the question
of what do you do in a negotiation when the lawyer on the other side
tells you he's going to do something unethical in the future. Forget the
agreement. He just says, you know, he just says this document is never
going to see the light of day in any litigation I'm going to handle unless
you're on the other side.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I assume the lawyer will say it was inadvertently produced, it's a privileged document, I have a good faith basis to
believe it's privileged and I intend to assert the privilege for here and
evermore. What about that? He's not saying I'm going to obstruct
justice and destroy evidence. Does that trouble you, Judge Aspen?
JUDGEASPEN: Say it again.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Larry raises the question of what do you do
when the lawyer on the other side says, in effet, that he is going to

20011

SYMPOSIUM: SESSION TWO

907

destroy evidence. I assume the lawyer is not going to announce that
intention when he asks for the documents back. The lawyer is going to
say, "I'm going to assert the privilege from now on."
JUDGEASPEN: Well, if the lawyer tells you that he or she is going
to destroy evidence, it seems to me that you do have a problem that I
think Larry was leading up to. You have a duty to report that lawyer,
at least in Illinois to the appropriate disciplinary authority. That is a
duty independent of your obligations to your client.
MS. SIMMONS: But I thought that duty was, while the case was still
going on. If the case has been settled and there is no pending case with
regard to you and that other lawyer, then why can't that evidence be
destroyed, or those documents be destroyed? There is no case. You can
destroy your own documents.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I think the next problem raises the reporting
rule more squarely, so maybe we should wait on that. I didn't want to
leave this hypothetical yet because so far what I'm hearing is everyone
on the panel, well, maybe not Ms. Simmons, but the other two members
of the panel are saying this term is one you can't agree on. But, let's
suppose, the client says, "Look, the defendant has brought this
wheelbarrow full of money and is going to give me all this money if I
only agree to the settlement. I don't plan to bring anymore lawsuits so
I don't care about the fate of this document." Part of the provision is
returning the document. I don't want it anyway. And the other part of
the provision is confidentiality.
There's an ethics rule in every jurisdiction saying that you can't have
an agreement that restricts a lawyer from taking on future cases. That's
all it says. This agreement doesn't do that. It's an agreement about
confidentiality. Sure, there are some bar associations that interpret it
broadly, but who cares. I want the money. You're going to tell me I
can't enter into a settlement that's manifestly in my interests, because
of your fidelity to what a few lawyers in a bar association say?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Well, this again is a product still on the
market that is dangerous and can harm other people. And at the end of
the day I think that is the principle that ought to control what's done.
And I think a lawyer should start early in the representation of this
client talking about the possibility that somewhere down the road this
sort of thing may come about. And many clients say, at least, they're
not just in it for the money. It's a matter of principle. We want, you
know, the loss of Jane to mean something. We want a safer car. We
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want fuel tanks that don't explode. We want, you know, people to take
medicine that doesn't harm them. We feel that we want to accomplish
something more than just being paid. And I think lawyers need to talk
with their clients about what they are going to accomplish in this case.
MS. SIMMONS: If I entered into this agreement on behalf of a client,
I don't see where it prohibits me from coming up with another client and
suing the same company. Maybe I can't use this document he says is
privileged, but I should be able to find some kind of way to defend my
new client as well because it doesn't prohibit me from doing that. So I
don't see - and then I have not breached my confidentiality with my
first client.
JUDGEASPEN: The problem, Bruce, with the way you phrased the
question is that there is going to be a great gain for the client, so what
does it matter if we slide by an ethical consideration. It seems to me
that the lawyer's duty to the client to represent that client zealously is
always conditioned on compliance with ethical rules. We can agree or
disagree about whether this is a valid ethical requirement, but we
cannot avoid it out of expediency or out of the notion that somehow we
are not representing a client zealously because we are adhering to an
ethical requirement imposed on us, as lawyers, that is independent of
the client. I am not really concerned at all, and I think what you have
to do is what the client's expectation is: that you are going to represent
that client zealously, you are going to do everything you can for that
client, but you are going to play by the rules, or whatever we agree the
rules ought to be.
AUDIENCE: I've got to ask about as a practical matter what the rules
should be? I mean do we ask lawyers in these situations with these kind
of pressures to police themselves, or do we do it as a proposal to amend
Rule 26(c), placing duties on the courts to scrutinize settlements? Is
that a more practical way to achieve what I think we might agree to in
principle?
JUDGE ASPEN: Well, I do not think you want a lot of satellite
litigation. Obviously, in certain litigation situations the judge must
approve the settlement agreement in certain statutory proceedings. But
to say that every settlement must have the approval of the court is not
a very practical solution and one that would involve a lot of satellite
litigation.
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PROFESSOR GREEN: Let's turn to the last hypothetical, number
three. You represent the defendant in an employment discrimination
action. The judge sends the case to mediation. In mediation it becomes
clear that the plaintiff's lawyer is handling the case despite a conflict of
interest. The mediator threatens to reveal the conflict to the court. I
want to leave aside the whole issue about the mediator here because
that's the subject of a panel tomorrow. The plaintiff's lawyer offers to
settle the case on favorable terms provided that the conflict of interest
will not be reported to anyone. Your client instructs you to accept the
offer. What do you think?
JUDGE ASPEN: Easy. It is the lawyer's duty to report the conflict
of interest. The mediator, as a lawyer, has a duty to report the conflict
of interest.
PROFESSOR GREEN:
understanding -

Let's suppose we're not in Illinois.

My

JUDGEASPEN: This time of year it is a good supposition.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I don't know what the rule is in Georgia.
Why don't you tell us the rule.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: There's an interesting note to this.
We're talking about Model Rule 8.3 that says a lawyer who has nonprivileged information about attorney misconduct that goes to an
attorney's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer has a duty to
report that to the Bar authorities. When Georgia adopted Rule 8.3,
again effective January 1, they did something very interesting. They
adopted the rule, but they set no punishment for the failure to obey it.
Now, I've heard of weak rules. I'm not sure that it's still a rule if it
has no sanctions whatsoever. It's truly just sort of an aspiration in that
regard. So I would say in Georgia, since Rule 8.3 has no sanction for its
violation the question may not be as easy as it is in Illinois. I think the
intent here was to tie this restriction to 8.3, which envisioned a duty to
report.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Let me ask you about Georgia's 8.3. The
Model Rule provision, at least, provides that the reporting obligation is
trumped by the confidentiality obligation. So if the source of your
information, say in this case about the lawyer's conflict of interest, is
information learned in the course of the professional relationship, which
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would be governed by the confidentiality rule, 1.6, then you may not
disclose without client consent.
If it's the same in Georgia, then it seems pretty unlikely here that you
have a reporting obligation, even assuming for the sake of argument that
the conflict of interest raises a substantial question about the lawyer's
fitness to practice, which I think is a big assumption. Assume I'm right
that the lawyer here does not have a reporting obligation in Georgia, and
in most states other than Illinois where the court in In re Himmell [523
N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988)], said that the confidentiality rule does not trump
the reporting obligation. Why should you not be able to enter into an
agreement not to report misconduct that we don't have to report
anyway?
JUDGEASPEN: Well, the plaintiff's attorney agrees that as part of
the settlement his own conflict of interest will not be reported, right?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Right.
JUDGEASPEN: Do you think the plaintiff is getting a little fewer
dollars because of that?
PROFESSOR GREEN: The plaintiff is getting fewer dollars? Why do
you think fewer?
JUDGE ASPEN: The defendant is getting X amount of dollars to
settle this case, all right?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Right.
JUDGEASPEN: However, don't you think those dollars are discounted?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Right. So, in other words, the lawyer's selfinterest in avoiding being reported is in conflict with the client's interest
in getting the bigger settlement?
JUDGEASPEN: I would think so, wouldn't you?
PROFESSOR GREEN: So you think the problem is not that you're
getting JUDGE ASPEN: I think it has a lot of problems. I think that is just
an additional one.
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PROFESSOR GREEN: What if the lawyer says, "I'll pay the
difference out of my pocket?" Less of a problem?
JUDGEASPEN: It is probably concealing a crime of some type.
AUDIENCE: If the defendant, your client, is telling you to accept the
settlement, isn't the defendant waiving the conflict?
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: I understood the conflict to be on the
other side.
PROFESSOR GREEN: The plaintiff's lawyer had the conflict.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: The plaintiff's lawyer had the conflict.
And if, I suppose if the conflict were of the sort that the plaintiff's
lawyer formerly represented the defendant and is bringing an action
against a former client, then the lawyer for the defendant has something
she could do, that is she could move to recuse the attorney for the other
side. On the other hand, if the conflict is, say, that the plaintiff's
attorney is representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially
differing interests then in Georgia, at least, the opposing party can't
move to recuse the attorney for the other side because that attorney may
have a conflict among that attorney's clients. And I think that's the sort
of hypothetical that we're dealing with here.
PROFESSOR GREEN: You could imagine a situation that raises the
reporting rule where the plaintiff and the plaintiff's lawyer both engaged
in misconduct. Then it's in their mutual interest to have this provision.
And then you don't have the conflict that Judge Aspen talked about
between the client and the plaintiff and the plaintiff's lawyer.
The draft guidelines are a work in progress, obviously, and we had two
versions before us which were diametrically different. One, which is the
one that you all have, says an attorney may not condition settlement on
an agreement not to report opposing counsel's misconduct. You just
can't do it. The other version that was considered would have said you
can have that agreement except in the situation where the reporting
rules would require the lawyer to report, which, except in Illinois, is a
very small number of cases.
I'm not sure that the ABA Model Rules speak clearly to the question
of what you can agree on or not agree on. I think it would be helpful for
the committee to know, what do you think the better rule would be?
You can have the provision or you can't have the provision in a
settlement agreement?
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PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Let me mention another Georgia rule in
this connection, having pointed out that Georgia in adopting 8.3 imposed
no sanctions.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Okay.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: Let me add that in the Georgia rules
there's Rule 9.2 entitled settlement of claims that provides in the
connection with the settlement of a controversy or a suit involving
misuse of funds held in a fiduciary capacity, a lawyer shall not enter
into an agreement that the person bringing the claim will be prohibited
or restricted from filing a disciplinary complaint or be required to
request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint concerning
that conduct. I think that's a very good rule, and I think there may be
some areas where the position ought to be that the need to report these
abuses by the attorney is simply so important that an agreement of
confidentiality should not be entered into.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Because it's really against public policy.
PROFESSOR ELLINGTON: That's right.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Maybe before ABA Ethics 2000 finishes its
work, you ought to send it that provision. I do think it's an interesting
idea. Any questions or comments? Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE: This particular one, the plaintiff comes in and says, "I
will pay you $100,000." Your client thinks that it is a wonderful
settlement, and he says, "Yes, take it." And you say, "No, I'm prohibited
from doing that." The mediation fails, it goes to trial and your client has
to pay $2,000,000 instead of $100,000. Is your client going to be happy
if you can explain that you did it for ethical reasons?
PROFESSOR GREEN: Any thoughts? As Judge Zlaket said the last
time, that's why you have malpractice insurance.
JUDGE ASPEN: You know, if the litmus test is a happy client, let us
close the book on ethics.
JUDGE ZLAKET: That's right. I mean are you going to buy my
silence? Because I'm your lawyer does that mean that I've got to sell my
silence? I'm selling my silence. Let's make it a little worse. Let's say
you know that client is a thief and has stolen a bunch of money, and
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part of the deal is, look, if you won't turn me in I'll settle this case with
your client. I'll give your client $1,000,000 in settlement of this case.
Now, what are we? I mean sooner or later do we reach a breaking point
where we say, I'm a lawyer. I'm an officer of the court and I'm not for
sale. My silence is not for sale. This is not my lawsuit. This isn't about
my silence.
And from the way you phrased it up there, it is about my silence and
it's about my, the lawyer's silence, not settling the client's lawsuit.
When you attempt to put them together, really it makes the - I
understand how you put the hypothetical together but it's pretty fuzzy,
but it's a real dilemma. But I think sooner or later you have to stand up
and say, what's being sold here.
PROFESSOR GREEN: Larry?
LARRY FOX: It's interesting because this hypothetical in a way raises
a slightly different question from the typical question, which is that
you're engaged in litigation and you see unethical conduct on the other
side. And the rules are intended, at least except in Illinois, to let the
lawyer help talk to the client and make a judgment. Is it really going
to be helpful to my client to set up a second front? Are we really going
to advance the ball in this litigation getting this client what the client
wants. And so we've said, at least so far in the rules, that we're going
to say that if the client's judgment is that this is a 1.6 and the client is
told by the lawyer, you know, you can stop us, stop me from having to
report if you tell me you do not want me to report.
When you get to the end game, the balance might be slightly different.
I'm not sure at this point. You know, I want to think about it a little bit
more. But it seems to me that the arguments for refusing to report are
different from the way they were while we were still litigating. But, of
course, you're going to keep on litigating if you don't get this settlement,
so maybe it's a -

JUDGE ASPEN: Well, I am not sure that the ethical obligations of
the attorney should be arena driven as opposed to professionalism. It
seems to me that you cannot say that an attorney has a different
standard, in terms of any obligations we impose on that attorney, in
dealing with other attorneys or in dealing with clients in a mediation
session that has been mandated by the court, as in this hypo, than he
would have in the court setting itself. I just do not think that is very
practical.
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MS. SIMMONS: And I would think favorable terms necessarily
means over-generous. I mean favorable terms, because I know when I
used to do litigation and mediation, favorable terms might be just what
the case is worth. So you have to weigh more than just whether or not
there's a conflict. You have to weigh the interests of your client, the
value of the case, and whether or not, what purpose would be served,
particularly when this is not a privilege, what purpose would be served
in taking that chance and saying, hey, I'm going to destroy the whole
settlement by virtue of making that revelation, assuming that you have
everything right and there really is a conflict.
PROFESSOR GREEN: I do have to say that Pat Longan helped us
come up with some really vexing hypotheticals, which are fascinating.
But I know we are the only thing standing between you and the Georgia
Sports Hall of Fame; and, therefore, let me bring our panel to a close by
thanking our panelists. Thank you all.
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